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FARETTA v. CALIFORNIA: THE LAW HELPS
THOSE WHO HELP THEMSELVES
"Although the right to defend is fundamental, our concern is with
the manner in which that fundamental right is to be exercised."1
On July 7, 1972, in People v. Sharp,2 the California Supreme
Court focused this concern on the right of an accused to represent
himself in a criminal trial in a state court. It concluded that such a
right, although granted by statute in many jurisdictions, was not to be
found in either the federal or California constitutions.
On June 30, 1975, in Faretta v. California,3 the United States
Supreme Court asked the same questions, yet arrived at a very different
conclusion. Anthony Faretta, charged with grand theft in Los Angeles
County, California, requested well before the date of trial that his public
defender be dismissed and that he be allowed to represent himself. After
questioning revealed that the accused had a high school education and
had once before represented himself in a criminal action, the judge
granted the request in a "preliminary ruling."' 4 Several weeks later the
judge sua sponte questioned the accused on specific points of the
hearsay rule and the state law on jury selection. The judge concluded
that the accused had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel, reversed his earlier ruling, and reappointed the public defender.
Defendant Faretta was subsequently convicted and sentenced to prison.
The California court of appeal sustained the conviction, citing Sharp,5
and the California Supreme Court denied review.6 In a 6-3 decision7
the United States Supreme Court expressly overruled Sharp and deter-
mined that the right was indeed to be found in the United States
Constitution and is binding upon the states.
The onset of this new doctrine in California law has generated
reactions ranging from fear that our criminal justice system will grind to
a halt to simple confusion concerning the day by day application of the
ruling. Indeed, a good portion of Justice Blackmun's dissenting opin:
1. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 453, 499 P.2d 489, 492, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,
236 (1972).
2. 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
3. 422U.S._806 (1975)-
4. Id. at 807-08.
5. Id. at 811-12.
6. Id.
7. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented.
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ion in Faretta is devoted to the procedural problems allegedly created by
the decision.8 After briefly examining the reasoning process that led
the Supreme Court to overrule Sharp in Faretta, this note will explore
eight potential problem areas which may accompany the constitutional
right to self-representation in criminal cases. These areas are as fol-
lows: (1) the standard for determining eligibility to defend in propria
persona; (2) forfeiture of the right by abuse or misconduct; (3) waiver
of the right by failure to assert it in a timely and proper manner; (4)
other limitations to invocation of the right to defend in pro per; (5) the
appointment of standby counsel to assist the accused; (6) a pro per
defendant's ability to appeal an adverse (verdict on the grounds of
incompetent representation at trial; (7) the necessity of advising all
criminal defendants of their right to proceed in pro per; and finally, (8)
the rights of pro per defendants to time for the preparation of their
defense and access to legal materials.
In each area the author will attempt to clarify the particular issue
or fear and to explore the pertient case law-particularly the law of
California, the state in which Faretta arose. Wherever possible, the
resolution that is indicated by that law will be discussed, and where the
probable resolution to a particular problem is not ascertainable, the
author will suggest the approach which seems most reasonable. By this
method of analysis the author will demonstrate that the Faretta decision
has enunciated a valuable and functional new right.
The Decision: Finding the Right
Both the California and the United States Supreme Courts agreed
that if there was any right of self-representation to be found in the
Constitution, it would be found primarily in the sixth amendment. The
sixth amendment, by its own words, guarantees to an accused "the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."9  Although both courts agreed
that the guaranteed defense is a personal one, they could not agree upon
its particular incidents.
When the California Supreme Court searched the sixth amendment
for the right to self-representation, they found no "clear inference" 10 or
"express support"'" for it. While accepting that the amendment did not
purport to bar a defendant from waiving counsel in a proper case, the
court nonetheless decided that the ability to waive the constitutional
8. 422 U.S. at 852 (dissenting opinion).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 453, 499 P.2d 489, 491, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,
235 (1972).
11. Id. at 455, 499 P.2d at 493, 103 Cal. Rptr. 237.
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right to counsel did not in itself create the opposing right to self-
representation.
12
When the United States Supreme Court read the same words,
however, it found that "[a]lthough not stated in the Amendment in so
many words, the right . . . to make one's own defense personally-is
. . . necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment."' 3  To
force counsel upon an unwilling defendant, according to the Court,
would violate both the spirit and the logic of an amendment that
contemplated counsel as a defense tool for a willing defendant.'
4
Moreover, the right found was an independent one and did
not arise mechanically as a correlative of the right to waive assistance of
counsel.'" The Court felt that because the sixth amendment guarantees
a personal defense, any constitutionally adequate defense presented by
counsel has to be premised upon consent of the defendant. For
"[u]nless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense
presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in
a very real sense, it is not his defense."' 6
The Court found English and colonial history preceding the sixth
amendment supportive of reading that amendment to include the right
of self-representation. It was not until the early nineteenth century that
accused felons in England were even allowed counsel,' 7 and then only at
the request of the accused.18 The Court found a decided aversion to the
idea of forced counsel in the American colonies'9 and concluded that
the right of self-representation was expressly omitted from the sixth
amendment only because the framers felt it too obvious to warrant
recitation.2
0
12. Id., quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-36 (1965).
13. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
14. Id. at 820.
15. Id. at 819-20 n.15.
16. Id. at 821 (emphasis in original).
17. Id. at 823. The right to counsel was granted by statute in 1836, although
judges had been allowing the use of counsel as early as the mid-18th century. Id. at
823-25 & n.26.
18. The court in Sharp concluded from this same history that "as a practical mat-
ter" an accused had to represent himself. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d at 453, 499 P.2d
at 492, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
19. "No State or Colony had ever forced counsel upon an accused; no spokesman
had ever suggested that such a practice would be tolerable, much less advisable." Fa-
retta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). The California Supreme Court felt that
the evil to be prevented was forcing a defendant to pay for unwanted counsel, and found
"only vague notions of a fundamental right of self-representation which predated the fed-
eral Constitution." People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 454, 499 P.2d 489, 492, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 236 (1972).
20. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975).
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Believing that both the language and history of the sixth amend-
ment mandated a constitutional right to self-representation, the Supreme
Court then attempted to find support in federal case law, a task compli-
cated by the fact that the right of self-representation in federal courts
has been provided for by statute since 1789.21 It was therefore general-
ly difficult to tell whether the source of the right granted by a court in
any particular case was constitutional or merely statutory.22 The only
Supreme Court language on point was contained in dictum.23
The United States Courts of Appeals, however, have confronted
the problem more squarely. In United States v. Plattner,24 the court
found that the right to assistance of counsel was meant only to buttress
"the absolute and primary right to conduct one's own defense in propria
persona. 25  The courts of appeals of five other circuits had taken
similar stands, 26 while only one circuit had explicitly concluded the right
to be purely statutory.27
Having thus examined the language and history of the sixth
amendment and the case law surrounding it, the Faretta majority felt
compelled to recognize the constitutional stature of the right to self-
representation. The Court noted that it faced a
nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as
our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is
contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to
do so.
2 8
The Court was well aware that its decision will often result in an accused
receiving a poorer defense than he is entitled to. 29  It concluded,
however, that the ultimate goal of the sixth amendment was not to
guarantee what was objectively the best defense-that is, by counsel-
but rather to secure what was subjectively the best defense-that which
21. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92, as amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654.
22. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir. 1963) (recog-
nizing statutory aspects of the right, but presenting confusing implications of coexistent
constitutional aspect of the right).
23. Adams ex rel. McCann v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942). Note
that the dictum is in substantial agreement with Faretta.
24. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
25. Id. at 274.
26. United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Sterman, 415 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1969); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d
100, 103 (7th Cir. 1969); Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
1969); McKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35, 41 (5th Cir. 1959).
27. Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The Faretta
majority brushed this case off as a plurality opinion. 422 U.S. at 817. The Sharp court
found it more persuasive. 7 Cal. 3d at 457, 499 P.2d at 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
28. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975).
29. Id. at 832-34.
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the accused personally chooses. For "although he may conduct his own
defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out
of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' -3
The Standard
One of the fundamental questions concerning pro per representa-
tion is the standard or test an accused must meet to be allowed to so
proceed. Must any and all requests be automatically granted? If there
are limits, what are they and by whom are they to be determined? These
questions, of course, will only be answered with certainty by the courts
as they interpret and apply Faretta. For now, however, they can be
tentatively answered by examining the source to which the courts will
most likely turn-existing case law.
The most pertinent source of guidance, of course, will be Faretta
itself. Although there existed ample pre-Faretta language on standards
for waiver of counsel,3 the Court nonetheless developed new lan-
guage. 2 The Court examined the accused's trial record and found that
he had
clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted
to represent himself . . . that [he] was literate, competent, and
understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed
free will.88
Defendant had been warned of the danger of proceeding in pro per and
advised that he would be held to standard trial procedure. 34 In view of
these factors, the Court found his degree of technical legal knowledge
irrelevant35 and held that forcing counsel upon the accused under these
circumstances had deprived him of his "constitutional right to conduct
his own defense."'3 6
A most interesting and instructive aspect of this new standard is
that the Court declined to adopt verbatim the existing waiver of counsel
test. Although the two standards are in many ways identical, there are
differences that were apparently of critical importance to the Faretta
Court. The foundation of the pre-Faretta test in the federal system was
that any decision to waive counsel and proceed in pro per must have
been knowingly and intelligently made.37  The question then quickly
30. Id. at 834, quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938).
32. 422 U.S. at 835-36.
33. Id. at 835.
34. Id. at 835-36.
35. Id. at 836.
36. Id.
37. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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became what constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver.
The first comprehensive definition-and the one most often
cited-was set out in Johnson v. Zerbst: "
The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particu-
lar facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.3
9
While generally retaining the "knowing and intelligent" require-
ment4" and additionally asserting that legal skills are not important,
Faretta asserted that an accused's background and experience were to
play no part in the decision.4 1 Moreover, his conduct would be relevant
only as an indicator of his literacy, competency, and the informed
voluntariness of his decision.
In another pre-Faretta case, Adams v. United States,42 the Court
noted that an accused's decision to waive counsel requires that "he
knows what he is doing and that his choice is made with eyes open." 3
This sounds compatible with the "informed free will" language of
Faretta. Yet just what constitutes "informed free will" is a point critics
fear Faretta has left unsettled. However, although the Court made no
specific citations, it seems likely that the Faretta majority would approve
of language in Von Moltke v. Gillies44 which grafted portions of Zerbst
and Adams into a standard compatible with the Faretta holding:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of
the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within
them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible de-
fenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and
all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole mat-
ter. -5
So, although the Court in Faretta did not expressly establish a
comprehensive standard, it did allow for workable parameters for such a
standard by criticizing and restating language of which it disapproved
and by impliedly adopting acceptable existing language. Thus, to waive
counsel and defend in pro per, an accused must be literate, competent.
aware of the charges against him, and apprised of the dangers of
proceeding on his own. His background, experience, and legal knowl-
edge are not to be considered. His waiver of counsel must be free and
38. Id.
39. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
40. 422 U.S. at 835.
41. Id. at 835-36. It is only fair to note that the Court was aware that Faretta
had defended himself once before. Id. at 807.
42. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
43. Id. at 279.
44. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
45. Id. at 724,
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voluntary, and his request to defend in pro per must be clear and
unequivocal.
The Effect on California Law
In California the pre-Sharp standard was, on its face, substantially
identical to the Zerbst test. In determining whether waiver of counsel
was knowing and intelligent, the trial judge was to consider "the nature
of the charge, the facts and circumstances of the case, and the back-
ground, experience, mental competence and conduct of the accused. '46
The acumen and skill of a lawyer were not required47 and could not be
the sole basis for denying self-representation. 8 All the accused suppos-
edly needed was an "intelligent conception of the consequences of his
act ' 49 and an understanding of the "nature of the offense, the available
pleas and defenses, and the possible punishments."50 Indeed, one view
of the pre-Sharp California policy was summed up when a court
recognized that an accused must be allowed to "venture into the un-
known. . . if he is aware of the dangers that lurk therein." 51
Although this language would appear to reflect a liberal attitude
toward allowing self-representation, trial courts were often very critical
of a potential pro per defendant's qualifications. An appropriate illus-
tration of this is the Sharp decision itself. The trial judge denied
defendant's motion to proceed in pro per after questioning revealed that
the accused possessed only a limited knowledge of the law and legal
procedure. 52  On review, the California Supreme Court affirmed the
decision, noting that the
showing of defendant's skills and abilities amounts to little more
than bare claims. He claimed general "knowledge of the law"
. . . without demonstrating specific or particular knowledge ....
In short, defendant's showing consisted, in the main, of a self-serv-
ing opinion that he could adequately represent himself.53
The implicit effect of the Sharp decision on California procedure,
though ostensibly small, was to give the trial court judge virtually sole
46. People v. O'Ward, 168 Cal. App. 2d 127, 131, 335 P.2d 762, 763 (1959).
47. People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 18, 338 P.2d 397, 404-05 (1959).
48. People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 24, 63 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1967).
49. People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 703, 464 P.2d 64, 68, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612
(1970), citing People v. Carter, 66 Cal. 2d 666, 670, 427 P.2d 214, 218, 58 Cal. Rptr.
614, 618 (1967).
50. People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 703, 464 P.2d 64, 68, 83 Cal. 'Rptr. 608, 612
(1970), citing In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 335, 398 P.2d 420, 427, 42 Cal. Rptr.
228, 235 (1965).
51. People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 24, 63 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1967).
52. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 452-53, 499 P.2d 489, 490-91, 103 Cal. Rptr.
233, 234-35 (1972).
53. Id, at 452 n.2, 499 P.2d at 491, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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power to determine whether an accused could defend in pro per.54  By
defining the right to self-representation as less than constitutional, a
denial of the right at the trial level would only be grounds for reversal on
appeal if it had caused a miscarriage of justice.5 Faretta, however, did
not speak of the constitutional right of self-representation in terms of a
"harmless error" rule. The Second Circuit, in the Plattner decision, had
flatly stated that an improper denial of the right would be reversible
error per se.56 Although Faretta did not directly affirm this conclusion,
it clearly implied that an improper denial could not be justified either by
a showing that the accused received adequate representation by counsel,
or by a showing that he would have received inadequate representation
proceeding in pro per.57
So the effect of Faretta in California will be primarily twofold:
when an accused voluntarily and unequivocally requests to defend in pro
per and knowingly and intelligently waives counsel with a full under-
standing of the gravity of his decision, his request must be granted; and
where the trial record shows that the defendant complied with these
requirements, 58 denial of the right will not be open to retrospective
justification.59
Forfeiture
Perhaps the major fear raised by Faretta is that it will further
impede the progress of an already painfully slow legal process and will
turn our courts into political circuses ringmastered by defendants with
very little to lose. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun felt compelled to re-
mark, "I fear that the right to self-representation constitutionalized today
frequently will cause procedural confusion without advancing any sig-
nificant strategic interest of the defendant.
60
Despite this admonition, a look at state and federal law quickly
reveals that fears of such procedural anarchy are simply untenable. The
major premise of the fear is that, being of constitutional stature, the
right of self-representation is effectively absolute, thereby rendering
54. For a full discussion of the impact of the Sharp decision in California see
Note, People v. Sharp: Death Knell for Pro Se Representation in Criminal Trials in
California?, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 431 (1973).
55. E.g., Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1965).
56. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
57. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). See also Note, The Right
to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California, 40 ALBANY L. REv. 423, 436-37 (1976).
58. The trial record should contain the factual basis of any decision to proceed
in pro per. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
59. It should be apparent that judicial discretion will still play a part, albeit re-
duced. Until the phrase "knowingly and intelligently" is reduced to objective certainty,
there will be marginal cases demanding human judgment.
60. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 846 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
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judges powerless to control any defendant with a mind to use this right
to disrupt the proceedings.
It has long been established, however, that even a constitutional
right cannot be used to subvert a trial"' or to effect other dilatory
purposes. 62 The Court made this quite clear in Faretta, saying flatly
that "the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant
who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct."6
That the right is forfeitable in the wake of "disorderly, disruptive
and disrespectful" conduct by the accused was clearly established in
Illinois v. Allen. 4  After the defendant had violently cast standby
counsel's files about the courtroom, he was removed from the chambers
and ordered to have counsel conduct the remainder of the case. In
approving the trial judge's actions, the Supreme Court noted:
The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards
of conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial
judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant
defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circum-
stances of each case. 65
It should be noted, however, that although disruptive conduct is
clearly grounds for forfeiting the right, the mere apprehension that
defendant will so abuse the right, no matter how well founded, cannot
justify prospective denial of the right to self-representation. United
States v. Dougherty"6 was a case in which the trial court, fearing such
conduct, forced counsel upon several defendants. On appeal, the circuit
court held that fatal error had been committed, in spite of the fact that
the behavior of defendants at trial would indeed have been reason to
revoke the right had it been granted. The court went on to clarify
"disruptive conduct" as acts showing the "intent to upset or unreasona-
bly delay the hearing.
'8 7
From these cases it should be clear that criminal defendants pro-
ceeding in pro per will not be allowed free rein to frustrate the proceed-
ings by their personal conduct. The right to self-representation is
clearly forfeitable in the wake of disruptive conduct.
Waiver
There are additional restrictions permissible to prevent abuse of the
61. E.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
62. E.g., People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 332-33, 210 P.2d 13, 19 (1949).
63. 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
64. 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). Allen is cited as approved authority in Faretta.
422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46.
65. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
66. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
67. Id. at 1127.
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right. If proper procedure is not observed to invoke and keep the
right, it is subject to waiver.
Thus in People v. Loving6 8 the accused moved to dismiss his
counsel and proceed in his own behalf the day before the trial was to
start. The court recognized self-representation to be a right of constitu-
tional stature but held that it was nevertheless "subject to regulation and
control by the court in the discharge of its duty to safeguard and
promote the orderly and expeditious discharge of its business."69  In
denying defendant's motion, the court ruled that a request to proceed in
pro per must be timely70 and could not be invoked to delay the proceed-
ings. 71  Under similar facts, another California appellate court stated
quite succinctly: "We cannot tolerate such bad faith and we are not
constitutionally required to do so.
'
"72
The court in United States v. Dougherty73 ruled that after com-
mencement of the trial, the right was, in effect, presumptively waived,
and any subsequent request to defend in pro per was left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge. In deciding whether to let the accused
proceed on his own after such a waiver, it was ruled that the judge
should strike a balance between the inconvenience that would be caused
by a dismissal of counsel at that point and the prejudice to the accused
that might result from a denial of his request.
7 4
Other Controls
In addition to waiver and forfeiture, other controls are available
from pre-Faretta cases which should be appropriate to govern the right
to self-representation. For instance, in In re Connor 5 the defendant
was granted the right to defend in pro per, but during the course of the
trial requested that counsel be appointed. Believing that the accused
was using the opposing rights to counsel and to self-representation in an
68. 258 Cal. App. 2d 84, 65 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1968).
69. Id. at 87, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
70. Id., citing In re Connor, 16 Cal. 2d 701, 709, 108 P.2d 10, 15 (1940).
71. People v. Loving, 258 Cal. App. 2d 84, 87, 65 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427 (1968).
72. People v. Smyers, 261 Cal. App. 2d 690, 700, 68 Cal. Rptr. 194, 201 (1968).
73. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Dougherty seven defendants were each
convicted of one count of unlawful entry and two counts of malicious destruction of
property. Defendants had made timely requests to defend in pro per. Several pretrial
hearings revealed that the defendants were articulate and well educated. The trial court,
however, denied the requests, feeling that the defendants' lack of legal training, the seri-
ousness of the charges, and the complexities of a multi-defendant trial combined to cre-
ate too great a risk of disruption if self-representation were allowed. The trial judge
was aware of rumors that defendants had planned disruptive behavior, but it is not clear
what role this played in the decision.
74. Id. at 1124.
75. 16 Cal. 2d 701, 108 P.2d 10 (1940).
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attempt to frustrate the legal process, the court denied his request,
commenting that constitutional rights "may be invoked only in the
course of orderly procedure."' 6  Having properly secured the right to
represent himself, defendant was not free to "interrupt and delay the
hearing at any stage he deems advantageous merely tQ interpose a
demand for legal assistance.
'77
Just as the accused can be refused counsel where the court finds
the request to have been made in bad faith, so also can the court force
counsel upon an unwilling defendant during trial when it feels that the
accused is using his right to self-representation as a tool for dilatory
purposes. In People v. Powers7 8 the court appointed counsel to take
charge of a case when the accused, having been granted the right to
proceed in pro per, asked for a continuance claiming that he ,was
"unable to testify or understand the mechanics or the consequences of
the trial.
'79
It would appear, then, that in granting the right to defend in pro
per constitutional stature, Faretta does not condemn courts to the
whims of defendants. Because the right is clearly subject to waiver,
forfeiture, and court supervision during trial, judges will remain in
control of their courtrooms. 80
Standby Counsel
There are two situations in which the issue of standby counsel can
arise: when the court demands the right to appoint one over objection of
the defendant, and when the defendant demands the right to have one
appointed over the objection of the court. As the law stands now, the
respective "rights" in issue are dramatically different.
There are numerous reasons why a trial judge might wish to
appoint a standby counsel in some pro per cases. Where, for example,
there appears to be a strong likelihood that defendant's disruptive
conduct will eventually result in a forfeiture of his pro per right, it would
be of immeasurable benefit and convenience to all concerned if there
were counsel familiar with the case and prepared to take over promptly.
Thus, in Dougherty, although the potential unruliness of the defendants
could not prospectively justify 4 denial of the right of self-representation,
76. Id. at 709, 108 P.2d at 15.
77. Id.
78. 256 Cal. App. 2d 904, 64 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1967).
79. Id. at 910, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 454. Apparently defendant hoped that if he was
counsel, and counsel was unable to proceed, the case would have to be delayed.
80. Indeed, the fact that the federal courts still exist after some 185 years of ex-
posure to self-representation should be evidence of this.
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the court could have properly circumvented subsequent problems by
assigning standby counsel before the trial began.8
The Court in Faretta expressly accepted this policy as compatible
with self-representation by. citing Dougherty and rather offhandedly
concluding:
Of course, a State may-even over objection of the accused-ap-
point a "standby counsel" to aid the accused if and when the ac-
cused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused
in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation
is necessary.
8 2
In light of this language, the power of the court to appoint standby
counsel appears to be unlimited. Indeed, back in 1970, Chief Justice
Burger in a concurring opinion to Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,"3 com-
mented that "no circumstance that comes to mind allows an accused to
interfere with the absolute right of a trial judge to have such 'standby
counsel' ..... " There is nothing in Faretta to imply a weakening of
this policy.
This power to insist on standby counsel, however, rests solely in the
trial court, for it is well settled that the accused has no right to demand
counsel in either an advisory capacity or as an active co-counsel.85  In
Duke v. United States,86 the accused filed several pretrial motions on his
own behalf but appeared at trial represented by counsel. When the
accused sought to address the closing argument to the jury, the court
refused his demand, asserting that the accused had the right to appear in
pro per or be represented by counsel, but that he was not entitled to a
"hybrid of the two."8" This seems to be the well accepted view in the
federal system. 8
That the right to counsel is an all-or-nothing proposition is also the
established view in California. Indeed, even when the California Con-
stitution phrased the rights in the conjunctive-"to appear and defend,
in person and with counsel," 89-allowing an interpretation that con-
81. 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
82. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975).
83. 400 U.S. 455 (1970).
84. Id. at 468 (concurring opinion).
85. Standby counsel can serve in either of two capacities: more or less passively
advising the accused when the accused seeks help, or actively participating in the actual
trial presentation. Because the courts uniformly deny pro per defendants the power to
insist on standby counsel in either capacity, they will be treated as one for the purposes
of this discussion.
86. 255 F.2d 721 (1958).
87. Id. at 725, citing Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 812-13 (5th Cir.
1953).
88. E.g., Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
927 (1969).
89. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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tained a "hybrid" right, the courts uniformly construed the language to
forbid hybrid representation."
The courts are understandably reluctant to force an appointed
counsel to accept a subservient role to an indigent defendant. But the
California Supreme Court has taken the ban on standby counsel some-
what past the logical end of that reluctance. In People v. Mattson91 the
trial court refused to allow defendant to retain, at his own expense,
private counsel clearly willing to serve in an advisory capacity. In
upholding the lower court's ruling, the California Supreme Court de-
clared that an accused need not be allowed the opportunity to partici-
pate actively in the case along with private counsel
unless the court on a substantial showing determines that in the cir-
cumstances of the case the cause of justice will thereby be served
and the orderly and expeditious conduct of the court's business will
not thereby be substantially hindered, hampered or delayed.
92
The federal stand on this particular point is not yet clear, nor is it
apparent how Faretta will bear on the issue. Duke, however, where
private counsel was also involved, could clearly serve as precedent for
accepting a Mattson-type rule as the federal standard. 93
Thus there would seem to be somewhat of a logical inconsistency
in the judicial system's attitude toward standby counsel. Although the
United States Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on the point, its
consistent denial of certiorari 4 to cases challenging the present double
standard demands the conclusion that, at least for the foreseeable future,
the existing policy will prevail.
Appeal on Grounds of Incompetent Counsel
A common criticism of the Faretta rule is that it will allow the
clever defendant two days in court: the first as his own counsel, the
second after he has successfully had the first conviction reversed on
appeal because of incompetent representation by counsel.
The majority in Faretta squarely confronted this contention. After
noting that the right of self-representation did not free an accused from
compliance with "relevant rules of procedural and substantive law,"95
the Court declared:
90. E.g., People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 789, 336 P.2d 937, 946 (1959).
91. 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959).
92. Id. at 797, 336 P.2d at 952.
93. See also Brasier v. Jeary, 256 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
867 (1959).
94. See, e.g., Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927
(1969); United States v. Private Brands Inc., 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 957 (1959); Overholser v. DeMarcos, 149 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945).
95. 422 U.S. at 835 n.46.
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Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal,
a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter com-
plain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of"effective assistance of counsel." 96
Although this definitive statement should serve adequately to dispel the
fears in this area of the ruling, it raises an issue of some importance: a
defendant who elects counsel has a right to competent representation,
but a defendant who waives counsel also waives completely any right to
adequate representation. It is suggested that such a result is unneces-
sary and has the deleterious effect of conditioning one fundamental
right-self-representation-upon waiver of another fundamental
right-competent representation.
By the standard test, "poor advice indicative of poor judgment on
the part of [counsel]" 97 does not constitute incompetence. Inadequa-
cy is a ground for reversal only where "counsel displays such a lack of
diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a 'farce or a sham.' "98
Even when a defendant is acting as his own counsel, it would be the rare
case where his representation met the test of inadequacy. The Mattson
court stated that a criminal defendant who undertakes his own represen-
tation
assumes for all purposes connected with his case, and must be
prepared to be treated as having, the qualifications and respon-
sibilities concomitant with the role he has undertaken; he is not en-
titled either to privileges and indulgences not accorded attorneys
or to privileges and indulgences not accorded defendants who are
represented by counsel. 99
Faretta clearly affirmed this proposition.1 °° An example of representa-
tion that is poor yet not inadequate is found in People v. Walker,101
where counsel's deliberate trial strategy involved not objecting to ob-
jectionable and apparently damaging evidence. On a post-conviction
appeal, the court held that defendant could not then raise objections
waived in the trial court and further held that a retrospective finding
that trial counsel's strategy was unfortunately incorrect did not constitute
a denial of effective assistance of counsel. 0 2 Under similar facts, the
court in People v. Montigo' °' ruled that a criminal defendant proceeding
96. Id.
97. People v. Logan, 137 Cal. App. 2d 331, 335, 290 P.2d 11, 13 (1955). The
general rule as stated in 74 A.L.R.2d 1390, 1397 (1960) is substantially identical.
98. People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 410, 326 P.2d 457, 473 (1958).
99. People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 794, 336 P.2d 937, 949 (1959), citing Peo-
ple v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951).
100. 422 U.S. at 835 n.46 (noting that the right of self-representation is not "a li-
cense not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law").
101. 266 Cal. App. 2d 562, 72 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1968).
102. Id. at 569, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
103. 248 Cal. App. 2d 32, 56 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1967).
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in pro per would be held to the same conditions. "The fact that de-
fendant elected to represent himself and devise his own strategy, which
failed him, is not a ground for appeal.' °4
Drawing a possible distinction between intent and true negligence,
however, the court in People v. Chessman'°5 concluded that although a
pro per defendant who deliberately waived objections could not later
complain of inadequate counsel, other circumstances might require the
court to interpose objections on its own motion. 106
A literal reading of Faretta would leave no room for such an
interpretation. Although affirming that a pro per defendant is not
entitled to special privileges, Faretta denies the converse-that a pro per
defendant is entitled to the full package of basic rights given to defend-
ants with counsel, including the right to appeal if the representation at
trial is inadequate by the established standard. By stating that ineffec-
tive assistance can never be the basis of an appeal, the Court has forced
the accused to choose clearly and irrevocably between assistance of
counsel, which must meet minimum standards of adequacy, and self-
representation, which need not meet any minimum standards whatsoev-
er. It is not suggested, of course, that an accused should be allowed to
complain later of any deliberate or intentional action on his part that
may have contributed to an adverse verdict. It is merely suggested that
it is needlessly harsh to deny flatly any reprieve to an accused who
attempts in all good faith to defend himself, yet falls seriously short of
that goal. Given the modest standard of adequacy required of counsel,
it seems insensitive to afford to an accused who is representing himself
no protective standard at all. The ability to defend in pro per should




Few today would question the soundness of the landmark ruling in
Miranda v. Arizona0 s that an accused must be informed of his constitu-
104. Id. at 36, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
105. 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951).
106. The Chessman court said "[we are not disposed to permit a defendant who
thus [deliberately] develops a record to claim prejudice from it, although the cumulative
instances of [the prosecutor's] misconduct might in other circumstances constitute grounds
for reversal." Id. at 178, 238 P.2d at 1008 (emphasis added). The inference seems
to be that innocently or negligently allowing such misconduct might necessitate action by
the court to assist the accused.
107. For support for the idea of- allowing appeal in such cases see People v. McIn-
tyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 324 N.E.2d 322, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1974); Note, Faretta v. Cal-
ifornia, 4 HoFsTRA L. REv. 449, 458-59 (1976).
108. 3S4 U.S. 436 (1966),
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tional right to the assistance of counsel. Yet in announcing the correla-
tive constitutional right to self-representation, the Faretta majority gave
no indication as to whether notice of this right will also be mandatory.
Although the Court did not consider this question, the answer derived
from an extensive debate in the federal courts of appeals is a somewhat
equivocal "no."
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Plattner,10 9 recognized the
right as constitutionally guaranteed and suggested that all trial records
should contain an initial colloquy between the presiding judge and the
accused, during which the judge would explain to the accused that he
has
the choice between defense by a lawyer and defense pro se . . .
that it is advisable to have a lawyer, because of his special skill
and training in the law and that the judge believes it is in the best
interest of the defendant to have a lawyer, but that he may, if he
elects to do so, waive his right to a lawyer and conduct and manage
his defense himself.
110
The court indicated, however, that while such notice was preferable, its
absence was not reversible error."' The rationale behind this optional
notice rule, explored in some depth in Soto v. United States,1 2 is "the
overwhelming constitutional policy in favor of granting a lawyer to every
person . . . ."I" Because the "judicial system is not neutral on the
advisability of proceeding to trial without counsel,""' 4 it has established
a policy calling for mandatory notice and automatic operation of the
right to counsel while requiring a defendant unequivocally to request his
right to self-representation without necessarily having been notified of
its existence." 5
Soto appears to establish a firm test for the requirement of notice:
where the defendant (1) does not assert the desire to defend in pro per,
and (2) the court knows his counsel to be competent, there is, as a
matter of law, no requirement that the accused be put on notice of his
right to proceed in pro per."6 This may imply, however, that if the
court has reason to believe that the accused may in good faith wish to
defend in pro per, or if the court does not know whether defendant's
counsel is competent, it may have the duty to inform the accused of his
constitutional right to represent himself.
109. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
110. Id. at 276.
111. Id. at 276-77; accord, United States v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1966).
112. 369 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
113. Id. at 237, quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12,
16 (2d Cir. 1965).
114. Soto v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 232, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
115. Id. at 236; see United States v. White, 429 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown
v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
116. 369 F. Supp. at 236-38.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
In deciding Faretta, the Supreme Court clearly showed considera-
ble respect for the Second Circuit's vanguard decision in Plattner.117 It
therefore seems plausible that, should the question of notice be squarely
presented to the Court, it would once again give weight to the ruling in
Plattner and the underlying policy favoring representation by counsel.
Although a final decision against mandatory notice would still leave the
right intact, it is suggested that a policy favoring representation by
counsel is inconsistent with the true spirit underlying the Faretta deci-
sion. Much of the language used in Soto as the basis of a policy
favoring counsel' 8 was taken from right-to-counsel cases where the real
issue was whether an accused could be forced to represent himself. It
seems unsound to use this language in a case where the issue is whether
an accused will be permitted to represent himself.
The Faretta majority was not unmindful of the reality that an
accused is much more likely to get the best representation from counsel.
Rather, it acknowledged this concern for the accused's best interests" 9
but concluded that free choice was a more vital concern:
The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the per-'
sonal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore,
who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case
counsel is to his advantage.'
20
It would be difficult to reconcile the spirit of this language with the
conclusion that defendant's free decision was meant to be an unin-
formed decision. The notion expressed in Dougherty- that every de-
fendant has "the moral right to stand alone in his hour of trial"' 2 '-
suggests that the right of self-representation can only assume its full
potential and significance if it is guaranteed the mandatory notice given
to most other constitutional rights.
Time To Prepare & Library Access
Although it was not mentioned in the Faretta majority or in either
dissent, no discussion of the practical ramifications of Faretta would be
complete without examining the pro per defendant's right to both
adequate time and access to legal materials essential to the preparation
of a defense. It is a well established constitutional principle that denial
of sufficient time to prepare a defense is tantamount to a denial of
effective assistance of counsel. 2  The California Penal Code 2 guar-
117. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-17 (1975). See note 24 & accom-
panying text supra.
118. 369 F. Supp. at238.
119. 422 U.S. at 834.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
122. E.g., Pqwell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1932).
123. CAL. PEN, CODE & 1049 (West 1970).
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antees a period of at least five days after the plea is entered in which to
prepare for trial. The California courts have affirmed that failure to
allow this statutory period is a violation of due process which constitutes
reversible error.1
4
In People v. Maddox'25 the California Supreme Court held the
statute applicable to a criminal defendant proceeding in pro per.'26 In
that case, the public defender appointed to represent the accused had
done virtually no work in preparation during the 21/2 months preced-
ing trial. When defendant's repeated requests to proceed in pro per
were finally granted on the first day of trial, he was denied a continu-
ance to allow him time to prepare. The case went directly to trial, and
defendant was convicted. The California Supreme Court concluded
that in light of the defendant's repeated good faith motions to proceed
on his own and the public defender's near total lack of effort, the
accused was constitutionally entitled to at least the five day preparation
period guaranteed in the code.'
27
This ruling, however, did not deal with the effect of either bad
faith by the defendant or diligent preparation by the dismissed counsel
on an accused's right to time for preparing his defense. The former
problem is in all probability covered by the general proposition dis-
cussed earlier, that an accused cannot use his constitutional rights as
tools for dilatory purposes.2 2s Faretta would clearly not allow a defend-
ant to dismiss his counsel and demand the right to represent himself
shortly before trial for the primary purpose of delaying the proceed-
ings. 1
29
The latter situation presents a more difficult, though certainly rare,
problem. Yet the possibility remains that a case will arise in which
defendant should be granted the right to represent himself upon a good
faith request shortly before trial is to begin, despite the fact that his
counsel has thoroughly prepared. It seems reasonable to conclude that
if time before trial is short by no fault of the accused, he should not be
found to have waived, impliedly or otherwise, his fundamental right to
prepare adequately. Any other result would render the right of self-
representation senselessly hollow.
In addition to securing time to prepare for trial, pro per defendants
probably need access to the legal materials essential for an adequate
defense. The California Supreme Court confronted this issue in People
124. E.g., In re Newborn, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 791, 350 P.2d 116, 120, 3 Cal. Rptr.
364, 368 (1960).
125. 67 Cal. 2d 647, 433 P.2d 163, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1967).
126. Id. at 653, 433 P.2d at 167, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
127. Id. at 654, 433 P.2d at 168, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
128. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
129. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975).
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v. Carter.130 After granting defendant's motion to proceed in pro per,
the trial judge offered to take him on what would have been merely a
cursory tour of the law library during a court recess, and said that he
would try to get defendant any library materials that he needed. When
defendant declined the tour, apparently feeling that so brief a visit
would be of no value, the court found defendant to have waived his
library rights. A guilty verdict followed. On appeal, the court noted
that a substantive right to legal materials does exist,' 3 ' and that although
this right can be waived, defendant's actions did not constitute such
waiver.' 32  As to the scope of the right, however, the court was less
definitive:
[A] prisoner awaiting trial who wishes to represent himself should
• . .at a minimum, be allowed reasonable access to such legal ma-
terials as are available at the facility in which he is confined. Hav-
ing thus stated the minimum requirements, we leave to the sound
discretion of the judge the implementation of the rule, noting only
that in many felony cases the minimum may not be sufficient.'
33
The court went on to add that "it is axiomatic that the more serious the
crime, the greater the indulgence the trial judge should show towards a
defendant."'
34
Thus, a defendant proceeding in pro per is entitled, barring some
waiver, to "adequate" time to prepare a defense and "reasonable" access
to legal materials. The precise boundaries of these rights, however, will
only become more apparent as the case law becomes more definitive. It
need only be noted here that in deciding Faretta the Supreme Court
presumably intended to pronounce a valuable and respected substantive
right. It would be sadly ironic if the trial court's discretion in granting a
pro per defendant time to prepare and access to legal materials could be
used as a means to punish an accused who sought to exercise his right to
self-representation. This is not to suggest that discretion should be
taken from the trial court and replaced by inflexible rules. What is
important is that appellate courts be vigilant and willing to intervene to
insure that deliberate or negligent abuse of this discretion does not result
in undermining the efficacy of the Faretta decision.
Summary
It has been the purpose of this note to resolve the fears and clarify
the alleged uncertainties raised by Faretta. It has been demonstrated
that, although the Faretta decision did not discuss in detail many of the
130. 66 Cal. 2d 666, 427 P.2d 214, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967).
131. Id. at 672, 427 P.2d at 219, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
132. Id. at 670-71, 427 P.2d at 218-19, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
133. Id. at 671-72, 427 P.2d at 219, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
134. Id. at 672 n.3, 427 P.2d at 219, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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procedural issues that necessarily accompany the right to self-repre-
sentation, sufficient guidelines already exist either in the case law or in
established legal doctrines. Although these guidelines may not be final
or precise, they provide a functional framework within which the deci-
sion can be applied and thereby refined to the necessary degree.
To recapitulate, there is a constitutional right to self-representation
implicit in the sixth amendment. This right can be invoked after a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the correlative right to counsel. A
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel is one by a defendant who is
literate, competent, aware of the charges against him, and apprised of
the dangers of proceeding on his own. The defendant's background,
experience and legal knowledge are irrelevant. His waiver of counsel
must be free and voluntary, and his request to defend in pro per must be
clear and unequivocal. If an accused meets these requirements, his
request to defend in pro per must be granted. A denial of the right
under these circumstances will be reversible error per se.
The request to proceed in pro per must be timely and made in the
course of orderly procedure. If not invoked within a reasonable period
of time before trial, the right is presumptively waived and thereafter
subject to being granted at the sound discretion of the trial judge. The
right cannot be used to subvert the trial or to effect other dilatory
purposes. Although a judge cannot use an accused's potential unruli-
ness as a reason to deny the right initially, he can declare the right to
have been forfeited in the wake of serious obstructionist conduct by an
accused who is defending in pro per.
The trial court has unrestricted authority in the appointment of
standby counsel to be available to assist the accused or take over as
counsel of record should the defendant's right to self-representation be
terminated. The defendant does not have the right to insist that stand-
by counsel be appointed for his benefit. In fact, pro per defendants in
California must even get permission from the court to retain private
standby counsel at their own expense.
As it stands now, an accused who waives the right to counsel and
defends in pro per waives any right to appeal a conviction on the
ground of inadequate representation at trial. The author has suggested
that the ends of justice might be advanced with relatively little loss of
efficiency by holding the pro per defendant to the same modest standard
currently used to evaluate the competency of representation by counsel.
Where the defendant has not sua sponte expressed a desire to
represent himself and the trial court knows his counsel to be competent,
that court is under no affirmative duty to notify the accused of his
constitutional right to self-representation. Although the Supreme Court
has not yet spoken on this point, the author has suggested that the spirit
of the Faretta decision indicates that if the issue is presented to the
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Court, it should hold that notice of the right must be given to all
criminal defendants.
Finally, the right to self-representation necessarily carries with it
the right to be allowed adequate time to prepare for trial and reasonable
access to relevant legal materials. The decision as to what time is
"adequate" and what access is "reasonable" in each particular case is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion, however,
should not be used in any way to deter a defendant who might otherwise
elect to represent himself or to punish a defendant who has already so
elected.
Phil Miller*
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